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The High Water Mark of Social History in Civil War Studies
Abstract

Just hours before the Army of Northern Virginia raised the white flag at Appomattox Court House,
Confederate Colonel Edward Porter Alexander approached his commanding officer, Robert E. Lee, with what
he hoped was a game-saving plan. Rather than suffer the mortification of surrendering, Alexander begged Lee
to scatter his men across the countryside like “rabbits & partridges” where they could continue waging war,
not as regular Confederate soldiers, but as elusive guerrilla fighters. Lee listened patiently to his subordinate’s
reasoning for irregular warfare. Before Alexander finished, he reminded Lee that the men were utterly devoted
to their commanding general, and that such loyalty would continue to inspire the sacrifice of more blood, even
if it meant taking to the woods and fighting like common outlaws. When Alexander concluded his
impassioned plea, Lee asked his subordinate to imagine what would happen if he turned Alexander’s
suggestion into official policy. But before Alexander had a chance to respond, Lee reminded him that virtually
every Southern community had been overrun by Union armies, that farms were in disarray, and that crops
were ruined. Lee feared that his veterans, upon returning home, would have no choice but to plunder and rob
for survival. It would take no time for his disciplined army to descend into a demoralized mob that would take
the rest of the South into a downward spiral of unending and unrestrained violence. “As for myself,” Lee
concluded, “while you young men might afford to go to bushwhacking, the only proper & dignified course for
me would be to surrender myself & take the consequences of my actions.” [excerpt]
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Just hours before the Army of Northern Virginia raised the white flag at
Appomattox Court House, Confederate Colonel Edward Porter Alexander
approached his commanding officer, Robert E. Lee, with what he hoped was
a game-saving plan. Rather than suffer the mortification of surrendering,
Alexander begged Lee to scatter his men across the countryside like “rabbits
& partridges” where they could continue waging war, not as regular Confederate soldiers, but as elusive guerrilla fighters. Lee listened patiently to
his subordinate’s reasoning for irregular warfare. Before Alexander finished,
he reminded Lee that the men were utterly devoted to their commanding
general, and that such loyalty would continue to inspire the sacrifice of more
blood, even if it meant taking to the woods and fighting like common outlaws.
When Alexander concluded his impassioned plea, Lee asked his subordinate
to imagine what would happen if he turned Alexander’s suggestion into official policy. But before Alexander had a chance to respond, Lee reminded
him that virtually every Southern community had been overrun by Union
armies, that farms were in disarray, and that crops were ruined. Lee feared
that his veterans, upon returning home, would have no choice but to plunder and rob for survival. It would take no time for his disciplined army to
descend into a demoralized mob that would take the rest of the South into
a downward spiral of unending and unrestrained violence. “As for myself,”
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Lee concluded, “while you young men might afford to go to bushwhacking,
the only proper & dignified course for me would be to surrender myself &
take the consequences of my actions.”1
Imbedded in this exchange are some of the most contested interpretive
points in the field of Civil War history: Did the Confederacy possess sufficient nationalism in its quest for independence? What did Lee symbolize
to the South? Was Confederate strategy doomed to failure, since its military
and political leaders were largely committed to conventional fighting with
professional armies? How did military operations affect the Southern home
front? And what enabled the Southern soldier to continue the fight long past
the point when final military success seemed realistic to those outside the
army? These questions crisscross two extraordinarily important books on the
Confederate experience—Joseph Glatthaar’s General Lee’s Army and Daniel
Sutherland’s A Savage Conflict. Barton Myers’ Executing Daniel Bright is microhistory at its finest, for it too engages these big questions of Civil War historiography in a focused study of a local guerrilla conflict in North Carolina’s
Great Dismal Swamp region. Although the authors look at radically different
forms of warfare—one fought by a regular army and the other waged by
partisan forces—their work signifies an important turning point in Civil War
scholarship, for they have taken the methodology of social history as far as
it can be taken to pursue these lines of inquiry. For more than twenty years,
the contours of the field have been broadly outlined by questions into the
common experience of both civilians and soldiers, the relationship between
the battlefield and the home front, how political loyalties were created and
contested, and why the North won and the South lost. These questions, for
the most part, have been and continue to be pursued primarily from a social
history perspective. The results have been extraordinary, especially in showing
how people of different social groups occupied the same historical space but
made very different meanings of their experiences. We possess a kaleidoscope
of patterns of a Northern and Southern society at war, always shifting, always
looking different, and always variegated, depending on how the historian
reflects the relationships of a particular place and people between the two
glass planes of the military and the home front.
Despite the rich and diverse outpouring of Civil War books, nonspecialists
continue to parrot the academic party line that Civil War history is preoccupied with locating regimental flanks, obsessed with battlefield heroics, and
infatuated with the most obscure and irrelevant tactical minutia. It is hard
to imagine a greater distortion of the state of the field. Civil War scholars
since the late 1980s have embraced the philosophical approach of social history, answering the call of Maris A. Vinovskis in his now-famous Journal of
American History article, “Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War?” Not
only did social historians find Civil War history, they have devoured it. Glat-
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thaar, Sutherland, and Barton are products of this intellectual tradition. They
exemplify new military history, which, like new social history, is not so new
anymore. Their reliance on social history methodology gets the reader to the
ground level of military operations, where they show how ordinary people,
stuck in the muck of daily life, tried to make meaning of a vast and terrible
conflict. Their analysis of what soldiers were thinking and how they were
motivated to commit certain political acts follows a historiographical trajectory
established by Gerald Linderman, James McPherson, and Reid Mitchell, all
of whom made distinct contributions to the study of what the rank-and-file
thought. While Glatthaar, Barton, and Sutherland reinforce our fundamental
understanding of soldier motivation, they are more successful than previous
scholars in explaining how Civil War soldiers—whether they were guerrillas
terrorizing the Missouri countryside or Lee’s soldiers charging at Chancellorsville—could act with incredible political solidarity at one moment and in
the next instance they could turn against their government, the people back
home, and each other.
General Lee’s Army is a masterpiece of historical scholarship. It is inconceivable that anyone will ever write again about Lee’s army with the same
analytical complexity of Glatthaar, for his findings draw from a staggering
array of archival material that has never seen the soft lights of a reading room.
Such a claim might seem hyperbolic, but anyone who looks at Glatthaar’s
bibliography will find more than twenty pages of cited manuscript collections.
The massive empirical foundation of General Lee’s Army sustains Glatthaar’s
insightful statistical analysis of the Army of Northern Virginia, which enables
him to conclusively demonstrate that slavery infused the lives of ordinary
soldiers, that military service never resembled a rich man’s war and a poor
man’s fight, that desertion cut across social-economic lines, that Lee’s officers
gave themselves physically to the cause, and that the vast majority of Lee’s
veterans were deeply committed to the cause. While these conclusions are
hardly new, they are conveyed with such power and persuasiveness that the
publication of General Lee’s Army feels like final judgment on some of the most
contested debates in Civil War historiography.
Glatthaar has written a smooth but analytically gripping narrative, far
exceeding the intellectual complexity of Douglas Southall Freeman’s enduring
Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command (1942). He accomplishes this by reconstructing the multiple ways that the Confederate high command, Richmond
authorities, Southern civilians, slaves, and those serving in the rank-and-file
engaged one another. No one is studied in isolation. Unlike Freeman, whose
traditional narrative intertwined military campaigns with mini-biographies of
Lee’s most prominent officers, Glatthaar structures his book around how the
Army of Northern Virginia functioned on a daily basis. It is his sensitivity to the
details of operation—whether it be the election of officers, the implementation
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of conscription, or the running of administrative departments—that gives us
new angles to look at familiar subjects such as enlistment patterns, the ordeal
of combat, civilian-military relations, problems of discipline, religious matters,
and the role of Confederate slaves. Rarely are questions of power and authority
removed from his discussions of the army’s organization and management.
When officers ran for election in the wake of the 1862 Conscription Act, for
instance, Glatthaar discovered how power largely flowed from the bottom up
in Confederate regiments. Once members of the rank-and-file were given the
opportunity to have a say in who would rule over them, they cleaned house
of officers who were deemed incompetent in camp or cowardly in battle.
Some good men lost their commission to be sure, but Glatthaar’s research
demonstrates that the election system gave promising soldiers a chance to
rise in rank. Throughout the book, Glatthaar recovers how soldiers existed in
a range of overlapping networks that could, at one moment, push a man to
join comrades in disobeying military authority while, in another instance, he
might feel compelled to join his buddies in a doomed assault.
Glatthaar suggests that the great paradox behind the Army of Northern
Virginia’s military prowess lies in the relentless desire of every soldier to have
independence in the ranks. Their inflated sense of individualism weakened
discipline, especially in camp; but when officers were able to channel this fiery
spirit of independence into an assertion of manly behavior on the battlefield,
Glatthaar believes that Lee’s rank-and-file coalesced into a unified fighting
force that had no equal during the war. Careless readers might misconstrue
the author’s argument as a modern spin on the Lost Cause tale of Confederate invincibility. In no way does this book romanticize the experience of Lee’s
veterans. Glatthaar tells a range of individual stories, including those of men
who did not live up to accepted standards of courage, who found themselves
punished by comrades for failing to face enemy fire, and who returned home
with the stigma of cowardice. In fact, Glatthaar is unmistakably clear about
the role of coercion as a decisive factor in forging unit solidarity, though at
the same time he acknowledges that a powerful esprit de corps took hold of
Lee’s men, inspiring them to make amazing physical sacrifices. By the end of
the war, Lee’s veterans were living on a diet that lacked the caloric substance
to sustain muscle and body mass. They were literally starving in the trenches
of Petersburg in the months preceding Appomattox.
Explaining what kept the Army of Northern Virginia together leads Glatthaar into the murky world of group consciousnesses. This might be the least
satisfying section of General Lee’s Army, for Glatthaar uses the concept of culture in a highly nebulous way. It comes to represent the center of the Army of
Northern Virginia, explaining a range of behaviors from recognition of military
authority to soldier dissent; but Glatthaar never gives culture a concrete function so that we can understand the distinct ways of seeing and feeling in the
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ranks. Culture, in General Lee’s Army, is largely an invisible force that permeates
thought and controls behavior. Glatthaar rounds up the usual suspects when
defining manly culture in the South—beholden to honor, eager to use physical
aggression, a craving for independence—and he believes this cultural baggage
from the civilian world was too much of a burden for professional armies to
carry. The author is correct that the transition to military life was difficult for
men accustomed to having mastery over their own households. Yet, the fact
remains that Union armies contended with the same problems of discipline
that ensnarled Confederate forces. Neither Northerners nor Southerners were
disposed to accept orders from a military regime, especially from men whom
they knew as social intimates in the civilian world. Thus the cultural exceptionalism of the South appears less exceptional. The analytical softness of culture
in General Lee’s Army, moreover, obscures what Glatthaar does better than any
of his predecessors who have written about the Civil War soldier experience.
He shows how the clash between the authoritarian nature of military life and
the irrepressible desire for survival pushed soldiers to challenge authority,
not as some cultural reflex, but because they were caught in a web of practical and political demands in trying to meet the needs of home, community,
the army, and the national government. To be sure, Glatthaar’s reliance on
culture does not take away from his impressive strengths as a social historian.
He is at his best when focusing on the intersection between material reality
and ideas to explain how Lee’s veterans coped with the stress of living away
from home while confronting the everyday threat of psychological ruin and
physical annihilation.
The terror of war was not confined to the battlefields of conventional armies
but spilled into the countryside, where civilians, runaway slaves, Unionists,
partisan rangers, bands of deserters, and common criminals engaged in some of
the most ruthless fighting of the Civil War. Both Sutherland and Myers capture
the chaos of the Confederate home front without engaging the impoverished
scholarly debate about whether the Civil War foreshadowed twentieth-century
warfare of total destruction. They pursue more fruitful lines of inquiry that
examine how guerrilla warfare influenced Union and Confederate military
strategy, how it shaped the experience of the home front, how it figured into
the process of emancipation, and how it forced Southerners to subordinate
political loyalties to the immediate reality of who wielded power in their
communities. On both sides, professional military men attempted to harness
the violent excesses of guerrilla warfare to advance national strategy, but they
had little success, as policymakers could not control local populations in the
countryside or in remote regions without large bodies of troops. As soon as
portions of the Confederacy fell into Union hands or were simply abandoned
by Southern forces, guerrilla bands materialized—in most states this was as
early as 1861. Sutherland is the first scholar to demonstrate that the Southern
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people were not conflicted by the prospect of guerrilla warfare. In fact, they
immediately pressed Southern officials to organize partisan troops, a demand
that took on more urgency in the wake of the Conscription Act of 1862, when
scores of able-bodied men were shipped into Confederate armies, leaving communities feeling more exposed to enemy invasion and more vulnerable to the
breakdown of law and order. The guerrilla bands shielded communities and
disrupted the operations of Union armies; but they also became increasingly
ungovernable as the war progressed, their unrestrained tactics intensifying
a Union hard-war policy that devastated Southern civilians, many of whom
wished that they had never looked to men like partisans John Morgan and
John Mosby as liberators.
Like no other book on the Confederate experience, Sutherland’s A Savage
Conflict shows how guerrilla warfare destabilized the entire Southern home
front—not just Missouri, Kansas, and East Tennessee, where murderous
bushwhackers roamed in large numbers. In so doing, he reconfigures how we
conceptualize the relationship between the military and Confederate civilians.
No longer can we assume that Southern morale hinged upon the success or
failure of great armies. No longer can we isolate civilians from the physical
and emotional terror of war, even if they were removed from the direct path
of major armies. And no longer can we frame the perspective of a people at
war around abstract questions of political loyalty or Confederate identity.
Throughout Sutherland’s richly detailed narrative, he reminds us that most
white Southerners, whether dealing with Union or Confederate guerrillas,
were not inclined to take a certain course of action because they had a strong
or weak sense of Confederate identity. They acted in a highly spontaneous
way, depending on the ever-changing conditions on the ground and on who
was holding the gun barrel.
Sutherland excels in revealing how Southerners trapped in an isolated
region of the Confederacy preferred the protection of local defense troops,
even if that meant sacrificing the priorities of the national government in
Richmond. Thankfully, he does not frame this important conclusion within
the debate over whether the Confederacy possessed sufficient nationalism
or not. Neither does Myers in Executing Daniel Bright, a focused community
study that surpasses Phillip Shaw Paludan’s classic Victims (1981) in analytical
sophistication, making it one of the finest books we have on localized guerrilla
warfare and one that would be a terrific fit for an undergraduate classroom or
graduate seminar. Just as Sutherland found common outlaws, deserters, and
other misfits joining the guerrilla ranks after 1862, Myers also detected taking
to the woods a range of people whose motivations ranged from slave control,
resistance to Confederate conscription, and defense against the Union army.
With the Emancipation Proclamation, the war turned savage near Elizabethtown, North Carolina, and a bloody cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation
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spurred atrocities on both sides. Barton shows how questions of power inspired horrific acts of killing and physical destruction. He wisely rejects the
universal and unsatisfying explanation that violence begets more violence.
Everyone knew that their very existence was at stake with the collapse of
slavery, the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the employment
of black troops. Barton shows how difficult it was for Federal authorities to
determine political allegiance in rebel-controlled areas, since the people there
were perfect chameleons in the ways they revealed their loyalties. This is a
critical finding, for it helps explain why the Union military escalated the war
against Southern civilians throughout the Confederacy.
The policy of extermination in North Carolina and elsewhere in the South
did not result in significant civilian casualties, but the rise of a savage war
had a powerful impact in changing political behavior. In the most surprising
finding in Executing Daniel Bright, Barton discovered that leaders of both the
Confederate guerrillas and the Unionists near Elizabethtown were so weary
of Federal military operations that they sometimes actually joined forces to
promote peace, protect property, and preserve social stability. Whether this
happened in other regions of the Confederacy remains to be seen, but Barton
concurs with Sutherland that when we destabilize the Southern home front by
acknowledging the ubiquitous presence of irregular warfare, we find that most
white people possessed a more fluid and contradictory conception of loyalty
than scholars of Confederate identity have long suggested. Barton’s study is
especially effective in showing how the traditional framework of nationalism
and Confederate identity does not often address how ordinary people crafted
everyday strategies of survival in a revolutionary war that often demanded
pragmatism more than idealism.
How ordinary people come together to engage in collective political action is
a shared line of inquiry that Glatthaar, Sutherland, and Myers all handle with
remarkable skill. They refuse to invoke the timeless, placeless, and essentialist language of identity as an explanation of group solidarity. Their success
in revealing general patterns of behavior through a bottom-up approach of
individual stories exemplifies the power of micro-history. Yet, all three books
expose the methodological barrier confronting Civil War historians who, for
the most part, are firmly entrenched behind the bunkers of social history. The
goal of recovering the historical reality of past persons and how they made
meaning of their lives through the lenses of race, class, and gender is the modus
operandi of most Civil War historians and academic scholars.
Sutherland, Glatthaar, and Myers are masters of this hybrid methodology
of social and cultural history. Their books represent the best of this wellestablished and fruitful approach, perfectly positioning us to think about
the next step so we can ask fresh questions about the soldier experience.
We are in need of a new way, one that digs below the meaning of language
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and behavior to explore how people thought and not just what they thought.
This would not only explain what they did during their military service--destroy, kill, desert, disobey, and act dutifully—but how they decided or were
disposed to commit such actions and why. If we complicate social history’s
emphasis on recovering historical reality through a materialist approach, we
might gain even deeper access to the very thought processes of soldiers who
endured an ontological crisis of epic proportions while trying to survive an
incomprehensible violent Civil War.
Peter S. Carmichael is the Robert Fluhrer Professor of Civil War Studies at
Gettysburg College and is working on a study of Civil War soldiers.
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